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Late in the afternoon on an early spring day, the Supreme Court of In-
dia began hearing the final arguments that would determine the legal status
of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community in India. Earlier
that very week, I told my parents that I was a member of the litigation team
- and that I was gay. Without warning, I found arguments from a heated
family discussion reverberating in the chambers of a court of law.
These dialogues were inevitable: both the ones in the courtroom and
the ones with my parents. In 2009, the Indian LGBT community took its
first step towards equal sexual citizenship through the Delhi High Court's
judgment in the matter of Naz Foundation v. NCT of Delhi and Others' The
Bench, comprising then Chief Justice of the High Court Justice A.P. Shah
and Justice Muralidhar, crafted a 105-page document that is considered a
landmark moment in Indian judicial history. The judgment not only em-
powered a historically marginalized community, but it also laid the founda-
tion to strengthen other human rights struggles in the country with its ex-
pansive reading of constitutional rights. Yet for all the revelry that
surrounded the judgment, there was an equally fierce backlash that played
out across Indian television screens as advocates for the movement faced
off with opponents from religious groups of all faiths and denominations. It
was inevitable then, that within two weeks of the decision, an appeal was
filed before the Supreme Court of India.
The conversation with my parents too, had been set into motion years
before. Maybe it began with that first wave of self-acknowledgment, or the
* Graduated with a B.A., LL.B. (Honours) from NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. A
member of the Alternative Law Forum, a collective of human rights lawyers based in Banga-
lore, India. I would like to thank my colleagues Arvind Narrain and Siddharth Narrain whose
work inspired this article. I am also grateful to the exceptional editors at the Yale Human
Rights and Development Law Journal.
1. 160 (2009) DLT 277.
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first outing (to a law school classmate, in the middle of a quiz), or even the
first piece of writing I did on the issue. I still recall the forced-casual call I
received from my father years ago as he inquired about "this academic
piece on homosexuals you wrote which I just found online." I registered his
emphasis on the word "academic," almost a plea -let it just be academic
interest. Even more vivid was the look on my mother's face as I informed
her in no uncertain terms that I wouldn't ever get married, "for reasons I
can't explain right now." We dealt with it by not dealing with it-until, that
is, the day we had to, when the implied became an expressed statement,
and the option of reading between the lines disappeared.
"Homosexuality is a disease." A sentiment expressed by a psychiatrist
to whom I was taken. An argument advanced before the Supreme Court of
India. "Homosexuality is a part of Indian culture, and has been for millen-
nia." Two judges grappled with this submission. Two parents struggled
to reconcile themselves with this information. Progress was made on both
fronts. A Rajasthani folk story was the more unlikely of submissions which
seemed to make an impact on the Court. Time, plain and simple time, was
what led my family to take their first tentative steps toward understanding.
I write these words at a time of uncertainty. It has been more than a
year since the Supreme Court of India finished hearing arguments on the
case. In the hands of a two-judge bench, Justice G.S. Singhvi and Justice S.J.
Mukopadhyay, lies the question of whether the lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender community in India will continue to remain outside the specter
of criminality-or be dragged back into it. An uneasy anticipation has de-
scended upon the LGBT community as all eyes turn toward the Supreme
Court, while tentative action plans are made depending on what way the
judgment will go. Uneasiness characterizes the silence between me and my
parents too, as we push the now-acknowledged issue of my sexuality to the
background of our conversations.
We don't know when the judgment will be out, and we can't really pre-
dict which way it will go. What then is this Note hoping to achieve?
I'm attempting to capture a moment of uncertainty in the LGBT strug-
gle in India. Whatever the Supreme Court does, it will mark a significant
milestone in the movement, the culmination of a litigation process already
more than a decade long. But until it does come out with its judgment, we
have the proceedings before the Court, and the context of the movement
that led up to them, to illuminate what lies ahead.
Which is all well and good, but why impose upon this a parallel per-
sonal narrative simply because it intersected with this judicial moment?
I think the answer to that lies smack in the middle of the questions the
Supreme Court judges raised over the course of the arguments. How did
the impugned section actually target the LGBT community? What was the
impact -the impact of the law, the impact of the Naz Foundation judgment,
the impact of stigma? At what sites did the alleged blatant misuse of the
I1052013]
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law happen? There are some answers to which the formal give-and-take of
the adversarial legal system cannot do justice. Sure, we can file affidavits
that testify to these experiences and produce media reports that recount the
correct stories, but there will always be a level of formalism to the dis-
course. Academic legal writing, it isn't necessarily less formal, bound as it is
by similarly rigid rules of constructing arguments and ruthlessly stripping
whatever it perceives redundant. This, then, is an attempt to counter both
kinds of rigidity. In the end, the story I tell is a universal one: the story of
how we are required to make a case for law's empire as it intersects with
different modes of power and shapes our lives. It is my response to the
questions of the Court, a response that would be impossible to truly articu-
late within the realm of the courtroom.
Another reason I make use of this narrative device derives from the
Romantics-the idea that if one describes the particular in enough detail,
the universal will begin to seep through. The stories I've elected to tell here
echo fragments of the larger story of the Indian LGBT movement and the
manner in which it has evolved over the past decade. I'll start by talking
about how the case finally came before the Supreme Court in the manner it
did. I will locate the middle of this essay within the courtroom as the ar-
guments were presented before the judges. Without a final decision to tell
us which arguments were effective and which ones ultimately bit the dust,
I'm again hoping to convey the mixed sense of anticipation and dread felt
by the respondents in the Courtroom as different statements were present-
ed and received by the Court. Finally, I'll end by discussing where the fu-
ture of the movement might lie.
Early in the Supreme Court proceedings, the judges asked opposing
counsel a seemingly throwaway question: "Do you know any person who
is homosexual?" The counsel was Additional Solicitor General Mr. P.P.
Malhotra, who replied that he was ignorant about "modern society." For
many of us in the courtroom, this exchange evoked an important moment
from another time and place -indeed, twenty five years before. Then it was
the United States Supreme Court that was poised to finally recognize the
unconstitutionality of anti-sodomy laws. What resulted however, was the
near miss of Bowers v. Hardwick2: a 5-4 decision with the crucial swing vote
of Justice Powell becoming a mythical point of contention in the move-
ment.3 Years later, there came another moment, and that time, it wasn't a
false alarm. With Lawrence v. Texas,4 the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Bow-
ers and effectively decriminalized same-sex sexual activity throughout the
country.
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. Much ire was directed against Powell's law clerk who refrained from coming out to him,
a point made particularly significant when Powell claimed he hadn't met a homosexual. The
Note will expand on this story in a later chapter.
4. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Will this be our Bowers or our Lawrence? Or will the Court possibly go
down a third path, abstaining from a declaration and asking the Govern-
ment to decide?
1I. GETTING THERE IS HALF THE FUN
"Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature
with any man, woman or animal shall be punished with imprisonment for
life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may ex-
tend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse
necessary to the offense described."
These words compose Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, the coloni-
al era legislation that has been used to "persecute, blackmail, arrest and ter-
rorize sexual minorities" in India since the inception of the Code, more than
a hundred and fifty years ago.5 The Naz Foundation judgment's stroke of
liberation came from removing consensual sexual intercourse between
adults from the ambit of criminality. There are a number of moments one
could start with in attempting to trace the story of the case.
In her book Loving Women, Maya Sharma locates the struggles of a
number of working-class lesbian women, in which the honor of a family or
village is often invoked to oppose the demands of two people who want to
be with each other. One incident involves a woman who "dares" to elope
with another woman being beaten and stripped, having her face blackened,
and being paraded around a village with a garland of shoes on her neck.6
"Sahayatrika, a lesbian women's collective in Kerala, has documented
twenty-four cases of lesbian couple suicides in Kerala during the period be-
tween 1996 and 2004."7
An important moment that one might use to identify the start of greater
public discourse on LGBT issues is in precisely such a story. This was back
in 1987 when Urmila Shrivastava and Leela Namdeo, two women from a
rural background serving in the Madhya Pradesh constabulary, decided to
get married at a temple. Harassed about their relationship by a male super-
intendent at a police training camp, they took a photograph of themselves
5. As stated in a widely circulated open letter signed by, amongst others, Vikram Seth, and
endorsed later by Amartya Sen, available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/
international/open letter.pdf/. The signatories included over 100 prominent persons be-
longing to the fields of law, film, academia, journalism and medicine, with the letter being
widely reported across national and international media.
6. MAYA SHARMA, LOVING WOMEN: BEING LESBIAN IN UNPRIVILEGED INDIA (2006).
7. National Alliance of Women, India, INDIA: SECOND NGO SHADOw REPORT ON CEDAW,
207 (2006), available at http://www.iwraw-ap.org/resources/pdf/India%20Shadow%
20report.pdf (last viewed Sept. 10, 2011).
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enacting their marriage rites. Their subsequent dismissal captured the me-
dia's imagination and is one of the significant early "outings" of the LGBT
movement in India.8 In their own words:
"We were kept in isolation and not given food for 48 hours. They
coerced us into signing papers that we had not read. We were ...
deposited at the Bhopal railway station in the dead of night. They
warned us against returning to the barracks."
Another point at which one might anchor this narrative is the moment
of the first notable gay rights protest in India, organized by the AIDS
Bhedbhav Virodhi Andolan (ABVA)9 in 1992. The ABVA worked on issues
related to human rights of persons living with HIV/AIDS. Its 1991 report
"Less than Gay" was one of the first documents to locate the violence faced
by sexuality minorities within a larger circle of intolerance.10 Their public
demonstration was primarily aimed at police harassment; in a memoran-
dum submitted to the police, the ABVA asked: "When will the police get
rid of its homophobia? Is it a crime for two consenting adults (of the same
sex) to meet in a public place, become friendly and have a healthy discus-
sion on sexuality or any other matter - which may or may not end up in
sexual activity at a place other than a public place?""
As Suparna Bhaskaran explores in Made in India,12 the rise of
HIV/AIDS is significantly linked to the story of the LGBT movement. Fol-
lowing the discovery of HIV/AIDS amongst the wards of India's largest
prison, Tihar Jail of New Delhi, a 1994 survey found that two-thirds of the
inmates had participated in homosexual activity. The head of Tihar, Kiran
Bedi, opposed the demand for the distribution of condoms amongst the
prisoners by arguing that such measures would be tantamount to legalizing
homosexuality: "[W]e just need to sort out the gays by giving them medical
and psychiatric help."13 The ABVA's interventions then hinged on the
health and human rights connection, starting from the premise that Section
377 impeded HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. In 1994, they filed a petition
challenging the constitutional validity of Section 377 in the Delhi High
Court. But by the time the petition finally came up for a hearing in early
8. Arati Rege, A Decade of Lesbian Hulla Gulla, in HUMJINSI: A RESOURCE BOOK ON LESBIAN,
GAY AND BISEXUAL RIGHTS IN INDIA 142-46(Bina Fernandez ed. 1999).
9. Roughly translated, "Movement to Protest AIDS Discrimination."
10. ABVA, LESS THAN GAY: A CITIZEN'S REPORT ON THE STATUS OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN
INDIA (1991).
11. ABVA Memorandum to the Commissioner of Police, New Delhi (Nov. 8, 1992) (on file
with the Alternative Law Forum).
12. Suparna Bhaskaran, MADE IN INDIA: DECOLONIZATIONS, QUEER SEXUALITIES,
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2001, the group had disbanded.14
Another flagship moment was the extended conflict around the release
of the film Deepa Mehta's Fire in 1998.15 Depicting a lesbian relationship, the
movie was greeted with a storm of protests and attacks on cinema halls
screening the film. Despite the protests-or perhaps because of them-the
film ran to packed houses, and inspired counter-protests in its defense as
well. In one or way or another, these events contributed to the scant public
discourse around LGBT issues in the country, leading up to the moment in
2001 when the Naz Foundation petition made its first appearance.
A. The Naz Petition
A brief overview of the constitutional rights scheme vis-2i-vis the judici-
ary might be useful at this juncture. Part III of the Indian Constitution guar-
antees a set of fundamental rights ranging from Article 14, which provides
for the right to equality before the law and equal protection under law, to
Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. One of
the fundamental rights, Article 32, provides for the right to approach the
Supreme Court of India for the enforcement of rights guaranteed under
Part III. Subordinate to the Supreme Court are the various State High
Courts, which may be approached for constitutional remedies under Article
226.
In July of 2001, a set of raids rocked the city of Lucknow and the LGBT
community: first on a public park frequented by the MSM16 community,
and next on the offices of two NGOs working on safe sex issues that led to
the arrest of a total of ten people. The operation was conducted on the basis
of a complaint filed with a Lucknow police station, wherein it was alleged
that a certain Suresh had sodomized the complainant. Notable in the inci-
dent was the climate of homophobia stoked by the media, which indulged
in sensationalizing headlines, 17 and the Magistrate concerned further refus-
ing bail to the men. In that denial of bail, instead of siding with the relevant
law, the Magistrate clearly proceeded on the basis of his perceptions re-
garding homosexuality: "They... are polluting the entire society by encour-
aging the young persons and abetting them for committing the offence of
sodomy."18
It was towards the end of the same year that Naz Foundation, a Delhi-
14. See Arvind Narrain, QUEER: DESPISED SEXUALITY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 73 (2004).
15. See Rajeev Kumaramkandath, Glimpses of the Fire: Documenting the debates around the film
Fire, CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY, cscs.res.in/courses-folder/other-
courses/ papers.2008-03-17.1729485494 (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
16. Men Having Sex with Men, see, e.g., LGBT Section 377, LAWYERS COLLECTIVE, available at
http:/ /www.lawyerscollective.org/vulnerable-cormmunities/1gbt/section-377.html.
17. See, e.g., Gay Culture Started In UP In 1998 Itself, TIMES OF INDIA, July 10, 2001.
18. NARRAIN, supra note 14, at 70 n.10 (2004), quoting Crim. Misc. Case No. 2054/2001.
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based NGO working on HIV/AIDS issues, filed a petition before the Delhi
High Court. The petition asked the Court to read Section 377 of the Indian
Penal Code as excluding acts of consensual private sex from its purview. 19
This wording was important, since asking the Court to wholly strike down
the law would have had a direct impact on child rights groups that used the
law to prosecute child sexual abuse.
2001 was also the year that my family moved back to India after a dec-
ade in the Middle East. In the midst of navigating reverse culture shock, I
learned the meaning of the word "homosexual" and first encountered the
vague anxiety that it could possibly apply to me. There was nothing in the
world of popular culture to address that anxiety, though, the books and
movies available to me maintained a studied silence on the issue. I made do
with reading my fantasies into those stories, dismissing my casual reversal
of the protagonists' respective genders as an insignificant quirk. Also seem-
ingly insignificant was the intense friendship I had fostered with a male
classmate, failing to recognize in our back-and-forths the echoes of full-
fledged relationships to come.
In 2003, the Government of India responded to the Naz Foundation pe-
tition. The response came in the form of an affidavit, with the Ministry of
Home Affairs questioning the locus standi of the petitioner, asserting that
"Section 377 has been applied to cases of assault where bodily harm is in-
tended and/or caused and deletion of the said section can well open flood
gates of delinquent behaviour and be misconstrued as providing unbridled
licence for the same." 20 The affidavit noted that there was no evidence for
the fact that homosexuality was tolerated in Indian society prior to colonial
rule and went on to conclude that "[o]bjectively speaking, there is no such
tolerance to practice of homosexuality/lesbianism in the Indian society." 21
It further observed that "[w]hile the Government cannot police morality, in
a civil society criminal law has to express and reflect public morality and
concerns about harm to the society at large."
This first round was unsuccessful: the Delhi High Court dismissed the
petition in 2004 on the ground that the petitioner was not affected by Sec-
tion 377 and hence had no locus standi to challenge the law. In the same
year, the Court rejected a review petition challenging this order. On an ap-
peal filed by Naz Foundation, the Supreme Court of India passed an order
in 2006 remanding the case back to the Delhi High Court so the matter
could be heard on its merits.
2006 was the year I began law school - and the year I finally came out
19. Writ Petition at 7-27, Naz Foundation v. NCT of Delhi, 160 DLT 277 (2009), available at
http://www.lawyerscollective.org/files/High%20Court%2Writ%2OPetition.pdf.
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to myself. "Silence," says Cass Sunstein, quoting Kanan Maikya, "is a way
of talking, of writing; above all, it is a way of thinking that obfuscates and
covers up for the cruelty that should be a central preoccupation of those
who make talking, writing, and thinking their business."23 In most universi-
ty campuses across the country, it was exactly this silence that pervaded the
institution. Mario D'Penha and Tarun take note of this fact as they explore
the emergence of queer university campus movements in the anthology Be-
cause I Have a Voice.24 While reasserting how most university campuses have
reflected the social reality of homophobia by being far from safe spaces for
the assertion of students' identities, they look at the encouraging narratives
from two Indian universities that have engaged in creating spaces for sexu-
ality activism. Law schools in particular become a significant site for such
activism, seeing as how official academic narratives are grounded in rights
language and constitutionalism. From that abstract recognition of individu-
al rights, it becomes difficult to then deny LGBT rights without contradict-
ing the core belief of universality.
An important milestone for the National Law School in Bangalore was
the declaration in the University's official prospectus that it did not discrim-
inate on the basis of, amongst other things, sexual orientation. The Law
School's official recommendations to the National Commission for the Re-
view of the Constitution also suggested the inclusion of a non-
discrimination clause in the Indian Constitution on the ground of sexual
orientation. But while the National Law School also had a Gender Study
Circle that embraced queer issues within its folds, it was Jawaharlal Nehru
University in New Delhi that had the first queer students collective in India,
called Anjuman. Anjuman took on board the alliance-building project of at-
tempting to redefine the contours of the term "queer," to encompass any
person who consciously questioned gender and sexual norms.
In the context of these tentative movements towards queer campus ac-
tivism and the slowly emerging pop-cultural visibility of homosexuality, it
was possible at least to have academic conversations about homosexuality
in my law school. They weren't necessarily all positive ones, but I took the
fact that my peers were willing to have these discussions at all as encour-
agement. The first real sign that tolerance had spread further than I had re-
alized was when a classmate of mine did a paper on same-sex marriage,
concluding forcefully that such values absolutely could not be imported to
India. The vast majority of students greeted her with an uproar of opposi-
tion - they may not have engaged in much discourse on homosexuality, but
they were law students in the end, and the homophobia in her arguments
sat uneasily with their conceptions of justice.
23. CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SoCIEEs NEED DISSENT (2003).
24. See Mario D'Penha and Tarun, Queering the Campus: Lessons from Indian Universities, in
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So when I finally found my voice, there were empathetic ears to listen.
The first two times I came out to a friend, I was saved the difficulty of hav-
ing to complete my sentence - they did it for me. Encouraged, but still wary,
I began to explore my sexuality through the academic realm. An internship
with a sexuality rights NGO in Mumbai was my first exposure to writing
on queer theory and feminist liberation. I was enthralled. The next time I
came out to a friend, I managed to articulate my sexuality aloud. "I'm gay,"
I said. Two syllables, and two years to work up to expressing them.
Back in the Delhi High Court, the Health Ministry joined the fray in the
year 2006, but in support of Naz Foundation: an affidavit was filed by the
National Aids Control Organization that the enforcement of Section 377
was a hindrance to HIV prevention efforts. Corroborating similar conten-
tions made by Naz Foundation, the affidavit stated that by driving high-
risk activities underground, Section 377 made it extremely difficult to get
needed information and services to those most at risk of contracting HIV.
By the time the case came up for final arguments before the Court, the Del-
hi-based group Voices Against 377 had also joined Naz with its own peti-
tion, while the respondents list was supplemented by B.P. Singhal, a con-
servative activist, and Joint Action Committee, Kannur, an activist group
which was primarily opposed to HIV/AIDS organizing.25 The Alternative
Law Forum, where I now work, came on board at this time as counsel for
Voices Against 377.
The LBGT community followed the arguments in the Delhi High Court
chambers with great interest-as did many human rights activists. Tran-
scripts of the proceedings were widely circulated, 26 and in November of
2008 the arguments came to a close, the case reserved for judgment. The
next few months involved a terse waiting period for the LGBT community
and its supporters. At the same time, gay pride celebrations were becoming
more popular in India, with the summer of 2009 finding major pride gath-
erings in Delhi, Chennai, Bangalore, and Kolkata. Then, as if to celebrate the
spirit of pride itself, the Delhi High Court gave its judgment just a week af-
ter the pride marches.
B. The Judgment
I felt the first buzz of a new message on my phone at 10:45 am on July
2, 2009. Sitting in my fourth year law class on intellectual property rights, I
knew instantly what the message would be about. The judgment had been
scheduled to be delivered that morning, and I sat charged with the thrill of
25. Documents relating to the Naz Foundation case, available at
www.lawyerscollective.org/vulnerable-communities/gbt/section-377.html#more-168 (last
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anticipation. I'd found it hard to sleep the night before, the hours stretching
endlessly as I waited to hear about the verdict. And yet, when the message
came, when the actual answer stood facing me, I froze. This was it; this was
the moment, and if I looked now, reality would come down on one side of
the coin. Until the moment I looked, there was still the glorious uncertainty.
But the phone buzzed again and again until I'd counted six messages. I ex-
cused myself from the classroom, ran out, and flipped open the phone. Five
minutes later I was back in the room, the half-crazed smile on my face tell-
ing my friends all they needed to know, and in a flurry of whispers the
news was relayed all around. Spontaneous applause broke out even as my
phone began to ring, presaging the first of many gushingly happy conver-
sations I was to have over the course of the day.
A 105-page document, Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi and
ors.27 did not merely grant equal sexual citizenship to a historically margin-
alized community. It pushed towards a new discourse, away from the
medicalized idea of the homosexual subject and towards a vocabulary of
inclusiveness and tolerance. Deeply empathetic of the queer experience, the
judgment grounded itself in the right to privacy,28 equality, 29 non-
discrimination,30 dignity,31 and health.32
To truly appreciate the judgment, it's important to place it in the narra-
tive of prior case law and the history of the Section. Until Naz Foundation,
the reported judicial decisions relating to Section 377 were mostly prosecu-
tions of non-consensual sex between men and children, women or other
adult men.33 Section 377 itself can trace its origins to a 16th century law
passed by Henry VIII and the British Parliament, which made "the detesta-
ble and abominable crime of buggery committed with mankind or beast" a
felony.M Towards the end of the 18th century, Jurist Edward Coke's sys-
tematization of the English Penal Code defined buggery as "a detestable
and abominable sin, amongst Christians not to be named, committed by
carnal knowledge against the ordinance of the Creator and order of nature
by mankind with mankind, or with brute beast, or by womankind with
brute beast."35 In 1828 the British Parliament recriminalized sodomy to
make it a capital offense, applicable to British India and other places of
27. 160 (2009) DLT 277.
28. Id. para 47.
29. Id. para 94.
30. Id. para 104.
31. Id. para 26.
32. Id. para 72.
33. Alok Gupta, Section 377 and the Dignity of Indian Homosexuals, ECON. AND POL. WKLY.,
Nov. 18, 2006, at 4819.
34. An Acte for the Punysshement of the Vice of Buggerie [sic], 1533-4 (Eng.)
35. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
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trading in the East Indies.36
The first draft of an Indian anti-sodomy law came in 1837, as part of
the Draft Penal Code prepared by the first Indian Law Commission consti-
tuted in 1834. Clause 361 and 362 of the Code dealt with Unnatural Offenc-
es,37 defining the offenses as touching any person or animal for the purpose
of gratifying unnatural lust. With Thomas Babington Macaulay heading the
Commission, the final language of the Section replaced this idea of unnatu-
ral touch with the equally vague "carnal intercourse against the order of na-
ture." It is this definition that has survived in the Penal Code to date.
In his essay on Section 377 and the Dignity of Indian Homosexuals, Alok
Gupta notes that out of over 50 reported judgments under the section, more
than 30 percent deal with cases of sexual assault or abuse of minors, while
the rest deal with non-consensual sexual activities between men and with
women.38 There are only two cases from the early decades of the twentieth
century that specifically address consensual sexual acts between adults.
Whenever the question of homosexuality arose, it was linked to a narrative
of perversity-a view that remained remarkably consistent over the dec-
ades. A Sind Court in 1933 noted that "sodomy is one of those offences for
which there can be hardly any extenuating circumstances; and even if so it
cannot justify an over lenient sentence of four months rigorous imprison-
ment[;]" 39 seventy years later the Supreme Court noted that "[slexual of-
fences, however, constitute an altogether different kind of crime, which is
the result of a perverse mind. The perversity may result in homosexuality
or in the commission of rape." 40 The unnatural carnal intercourse was at
different points referred to as being an act of men of "depraved morality,"
41 and one that was "abhorred by civilized society." 42 The few cases that
dealt with consensual homosexual sex only reaffirm this: in Noshirwan v.
Emperor,43 two men were caught attempting to commit sodomy in a house
and reported to the police. Though they were not convicted because the act
of sodomy was never completed, the judge reprimanded the accused as a
"despicable" specimen of humanity for being addicted to the "vice of a cat-
amite[.]"44
36. An Act for Improving the Administration of Criminal Justice in the East-Indies, 1828,
c.74 (Eng.).
37. Draft Penal Code of 1837 by Lord Macaulay - A Penal Code, Prepared by The Indian
Law Commissioners, And Published by Command of The Governor General of India in Coun-
cil, The Law Book Exchange Limited, Union, New Jersey, 2002. Draft Penal Code of 1837 by Lord
Macaulay (Vol II, p 42).
38. Alok Gupta, Section 377 and the Dignity of Indian Homosexuals, EcON. AND POL. WKLY.,
Nov. 18, 2006.
39. Emperor v. Mohamed Yousif AIR 1933 Sind 87, at 4819.
40.T.K. Gopal v. State Karnataka AIR 2000 SC 1669.
41. Mirro v. Emperor AIR 1947 Allahabad 97.
42. Mihir v. State 1992 CriLJ 488, 2.
43. Noshirwan v. Emperor AIR 1934 Sind 206.
44. Id. at 208.
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Naz Foundation's most important achievement then was the manner in
which it inaugurated a new discourse on queerness, one that moved away
from the clinical, detached view of the homosexual to instead embrace the
LGBT community within a language of dignity and inclusiveness. "If there
is one constitutional tenet," says the judgment, "that can be said to be [the]
underlying theme of the Indian Constitution, it is that of 'inclusiveness'.
This Court believes that [the] Indian Constitution reflects this value deeply
ingrained in Indian society, nurtured over several generations." 45
The Court took this ethos to heart, starting by elaborating on the con-
cept of dignity within the Constitutional framework. "[I]t is clear that the
constitutional protection of dignity requires us to acknowledge the value
and worth of all individuals as members of our society." 46 The judgment
simultaneously elaborated on the right to privacy, expanding the concept
from the zonal understanding under which prior Indian case law placed it,
to also include a decisional notion: privacy that "deals with persons and not
places." 47 Noting that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21
of the Indian Constitution encompassed the rights to dignity and privacy,
the Court held that Section 377 was unconstitutional in so far as it denied a
person's dignity and criminalized their "core identity" solely on the basis of
their sexuality, and that it further denied the right to "full personhood." 48
A particularly radical move was the Court's re-interpretation of Article
15 of the Indian Constitution. Article 15 is a specific application of the gen-
eral doctrine of equality guaranteed by Article 14- where the latter guaran-
tees equality under the law and equal protection before it, the former lists
prohibited grounds of discrimination, namely religion, race, caste, sex, and
place of birth. The Court expanded the dimensions of Article 15 through its
finding that "sexual orientation is a ground analogous to sex and that dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not permitted by Article
15."49 just as significantly, the Court noted that grounds which were not
expressly highlighted in Article 15, but were analogous to those listed,
might qualify for protection, since "personal autonomy is inherent in the
grounds mentioned in Article 15."50
Also significant was the court's discussion on constitutional morality.
In responding to arguments about whether popular morality could stand as
a justification for restriction of fundamental rights, the Court answered in
the negative. It noted that popular morality was merely based on shifting
notions of right and wrong, whereas constitutional morality, derived from
constitutional values, was a more solid standard. It quoted the chairman of
45. 160 (2009) DLT 277, para 130.
46. Id. at para 26.
47. Id. at para 47.
48. Id. at para 48.
49. Id. at para 104.
50. Id. at para 112.
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the Constituent Assembly, B.R. Ambedkar, in this regard: "The diffusion of
constitutional morality, not merely among the majority of any community
but throughout the whole, is an indispensable condition of government at
once free and peaceable . . . . Constitutional morality is not a natural senti-
ment. It has to be cultivated."51 Arvind Narrain articulates the importance
of this paradigm shift in terms of how the protection of LGBT persons
speaks not only to guaranteeing constitutional rights to a minority, but also
to the vision of the kind of nation "we all want to live in and what it means
for the majority." 52
C. Post Naz
Encouraged by the class's reaction to Naz, and finally comfortable in my
skin, I began to think of ways in which we could take the movement for-
ward within the campus and bring together people interested in the issue.
It began with Foucault: "Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain
the same. ... [L]eave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are
in order."53 This was a good way, we felt, to headline the invitational notice
of a forum whose primary aims include questioning the identities we had
painstakingly constructed for ourselves in the first place.
We started small. Three of us, huddled around the less rickety of the
two tables at our friendly neighborhood coffee shop, threw around ideas
about scope, structure, organization, readings, and most importantly, the
group name. Unable to come up with something sufficiently quirky, we
stuck with the staid but respectable "Gender and Sexuality Forum." The
minutes of the meeting were stored as text messages on our mobile phones.
The modus operandi was simple: discussion and debate, accompanied by the
occasional film screening.
With 60 active participants and about 10 curious onlookers, this was a
much higher than expected turnout. We started by playing to our strengths:
What better way to kick start a group conceived by a couple of queer stu-
dents than to weave in a discussion on the Naz Foundation judgment? We
were looking in particular at a critique of the judgment by the current Vice-
Chancellor of another of India's premier legal institutions. While the cri-
tique itself starts with a disclaimer against making any kinds of value
judgments, the statement "Naz Foundation ... has picked up and placed in the
central stage an issue that I doubt deserves so much prominence. . ."5 was hardly
encouraging. The group reached a degree of consensus on this point, and
51. Id. at para 79 (citation omitted).
52. Arvind Narrain, A New Language of Morality, in LAW LIKE LOVE 253, 275 (Alok Gupta &
Arvind Narrain eds., 2011).
53. MICHEL FouCAULt, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 172 (Routledge Classics 2002).
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discussed how those in positions of power or privilege could easily afford
to create a hierarchy of oppressions, placing whatever did not serve their
interests at positions lower in the hierarchy. An hour later, we had finished
the meeting, flushed with the adrenaline of a good discussion.
Meanwhile, a vast number of petitioners had lined up in opposition to
the Delhi High Court decision, appealing the judgment before the Supreme
Court of India. The first of these was Suresh Kumar Koushal, an astrologer,
followed in quick succession by religious organizations ranging from the
Apostolic Churches Alliance to the All India Muslim Personal Law Board.
The Delhi Commission for Protection of Child Rights joined a crowded fray
which also included all the parties in the lower court judgment, with one
surprise switchover to come later in the proceedings.
These surging numbers were met by an increase in supporters on the
other side. In addition to the Naz Foundation, Voices Against 377, and
NACO, a diverse set of voices filed a series of interventions before the
court. Parents of LGBT persons from across the country came together for
an intervention, as did mental health petitioners, teachers, law academics,
and Shyam Benegal, a member of Parliament.
Even as the opposing groups geared up for the Supreme Court bat-
tle, the impact of the Naz judgment continued to make itself felt, with the
story of Professor Shrinivas Ramchandra Siras standing out in particular.
Professor Siras was a 64-year old faculty member of the Aligarh Muslim
University (AMU). In February 2010, he was filmed having consensual sex
with another adult male within the confines of his house. AMU suspended
him shortly after the video was made public, citing immoral sexual activi-
ty.55 Siras's suspension was met with nationwide outrage. Objections were
leveled against the implications of the suspension on two grounds: the per-
ception of homosexuality as immoral despite the judgment of the Delhi
High Court, and the disturbing nature of the filming of Dr. Siras in the pri-
vacy of his home.56
On April 1 of the same year, the Allahabad High Court ordered AMU
to reinstate Siras, holding that his right to privacy had been violated, stating
that "the right of privacy is a fundamental right [and] needs to be protected
and that unless the conduct of a person, even if he is a teacher is going to
affect and has substantial nexus with his employment, it may not be treated
as misconduct."5 7 Shortly thereafter, the Uttar Pradesh police arrested two
of the accused who had broken into Siras' house to film him, while a num-
55. Manjari Mishra, Aligarh Muslim University Professor Suspended for Being Gay, TIMES
INDIA, Feb. 18, 2010, available at http:/ /articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-02-18/india/
281187691shrinivas-ramchandra-siras-rickshaw-puller-amu-campus.
56. Arvind Narrain, et al., Policing Morality at AMU: An Independent Fact-Finding Report,
FRIDAE, Mar. 10, 2010, available at http://www.fridae.com/newsfeatures/2010/03/10/
9724.policing-morality-at-amu-an-independent-fact-finding-report?n=sea&nm=amu.
57. Dr. Shrinivas Ramchandra Siras & Ors v. The Aligarh Muslim University & Ors, Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No.17549 Allahabad H.C. (2010).
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ber of university officials were also charged with criminal offences. As
Vinay Sitapati notes, none of this could have happened in a context where
gay sex was illegal. In that context, it would have been Siras who was the
criminal, and the additional wrongs done simply irrelevant: "[T]his is not
how the story was supposed to pan out. Those who broke into Siras' house
and AMU (and there are allegations that they are one and the same) as-
sumed that Siras's transgressions were so repellent, that their own would
be forgiven." The judicial narrative-of a victimised Siras, a callous admin-
istration and criminal house-breakers -owes much to the Delhi High
Court's view that Siras' sexual choice was legitimate.58
And yet this very incident also served to showcase the limitations of the
law. A press release by the AMU authorities demonstrated a continuing
disrespect for privacy: " [The University respects the privacy of a teacher
living in its premises but it also expects everyone to behave in a respectful
manner giving due regard to its valued cultural ethos and the campus sen-
sitivity including their neighbours' concerns and to the great moral creden-
tials that AMU has been nurturing since its inception." 59
Less than a week after the Allahabad High Court's judgment vindicated
him, Professor Siras was found dead in his room. The police ruled it as sui-
cide.60
III. THE SUPREME COURT HEARINGS
For the first few days at the Supreme Court, it was a waiting game. The
Court hours were from 10 am to about 3:30 pm. The Naz appeal would
make its appearance around the lunch hour and continue until the end of
the day-about an hour and a half of arguments. But in the second week,
the Court decided to clear its roster to focus on the arguments three days of
the week. There were, after all, 15 parties on the side of the petitioners and
seven on the side of the respondents.
Another kind of waiting game played out with my parents in our mu-
tual refusal to break the silence that had descended since our "outing" con-
versation on the phone. Where my mother's occasional calls skirted around
the issue but explicitly underlined it with her broken voice, my father chose
the path of silence. We were ultimately able to agree on me flying home
during a week-long break that we would get in the middle of the Supreme
Court hearings.
To take a purely chronological account of the Supreme Court hearings
58. Vinay Sitapati, The Spectre of Naz, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-spectre-of-naz/609695/0.
59. Narrain, supra note 52, at 16.
60. Deepu S. Edmond, AMU Prof Death: Police Say Poison Traces Found in Body, THE INDIAN
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would invite incoherence: arguments were often repeated, and digressions
were frequent. What I have attempted here is to glean out the major
themes around which the arguments revolved and present what appeared
to us as the crucial points in the litigation. It may well be the case that the
points we thought important have no bearing on the judgment, and it also
might be that this account misses some vital points. As I remarked at the
outset, we don't yet have the judgment to give us the clarity of hindsight; in
this proverbial groping in the dark, then, these were the highlights of the
proceedings for me.
The first major theme around which the hearings revolved were the
question of how Section 377 could be interpreted -did it even really target
the LGBT community in the first place? If it didn't target a particular identi-
ty, then the question of what particular acts may be covered under the Sec-
tion formed the core of the next part of the debate. Another point of conten-
tion was the position of the government in the matter -this last one taking
a surprising, and welcome turn. Finally, I'll discuss the fate of the argument
relating to the mental health professionals' intervention.
A. Interpretation
I will begin by highlighting a crucial point around which the question
of interpretation hinges: the words of Section 377 don't make explicit refer-
ence to a particular act or sexual identity. This is a reflection of Lord Ma-
caulay's reluctance to actually discuss the subject:
[We] are unwilling to insert, either in the text or in the notes, any-
thing which could give rise to public discussion on this revolting
subject; as we are decidedly of the opinion that the injury which
would be done to the morals of the community by such discussion
would far more than compensate for any benefits which might be
derived from legislative measures framed with the greatest preci-
sion.61
This "not naming" is a characteristic that Section 377 shares with many
anti-sodomy legislations- the Georgia Statute in BowerS62 is a notable ex-
ample. Section 377's enforcement too followed that of its mirror legislations,
in that heterosexual sodomy would escape the ambit of criminality, leaving
homosexual sex to be proscribed. This was an assertion the Delhi High
61. Report of the Indian Law Commission on the Penal Code, October 14, 1837, pp. 3990-
91, cited in Gupta, A., Section 377 and the Dignity of Indian Honiosexuals, ECON. AND POL. WKLY.,
Nov. 18, 2006, at 4815 n.5.
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (West 1984): "(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy
when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another. . . ."
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Court accepted without ado. It was also a point that remained largely un-
challenged by the respondents in the case. Even before the Supreme Court,
the respondents - now petitioners - did not focus on this point. It came, in-
stead, from the Bench.
The first named petitioner, Suresh Kumar Koushal, was represented by
Praveen Agarwal. The Bench asked Mr. Agarwal a number of questions on
the statute, such as what Section 377 explicitly spelled out and whether it
concerned homosexuality as such at all. What, the Bench was interested in
knowing, were the subjects it focused on?
As it were, it would be this set of questions that would become the
mainstay of the hearings, the point on which both sides would continually
be questioned. The wording of the questions would change and the impli-
cations for the parties would vary, but the fundamental question of inter-
pretation was always highlighted.
In a way this was a hurdle for both sides. Whether it was the petitioners
or the respondents, both broadly focused on arguing that, yes, Section 377
did in fact concern homosexuality, and that carnal intercourse against the
order of nature was in fact same-sex sexual intercourse. The petitioners'
primary argument then remained one of public morality vis-a-vis the law
reflecting the social opprobrium of homosexuality; the respondents, on the
other hand, focused on the array of fundamental rights arguments.
To take the example of the lawyer who spoke after Mr. Agarwal, repre-
senting the Delhi Child Welfare Committee, when asked what constituted
"carnal intercourse against the order of nature[,]" he answered emphatical-
ly that nature recognized only carnal intercourse between man and woman,
and that homosexuality would be the unnatural behavior implied within
these words. Similar responses echoed through the other petitioners' argu-
ments. Yet the Bench continued to pose this question, seemingly dissatis-
fied with their answers.
When it came to the respondents' arguments, one tactic involved at-
tempting to turn the question of interpretation on its head. No, argued our
opening lawyer Fali Nariman, the words "carnal intercourse against the or-
der of nature" did not refer to homosexual intercourse-at least not any
more. The term "order of nature" has evolved in meaning; as Mr. Nariman
pointed out, the only Court judgment to interpret this phrase was a 1925
decision that defined the natural object of carnal intercourse as "the possi-
bility of procreation."6 3 The Indian Constitution had since then made provi-
sions for family planning, clearly indicating that the definition of the order
of nature had evolved past sex-for-procreation. Hadn't we then evolved
past considering homosexuality against the order of nature?
63.Khanu v. Emperor, AIR 1925 Sind 286 ("it is clearly against the order of nature, because
the natural object of carnal intercourse is that there should be possibility of conception of hu-
man beings, which in the case of coitus per os is impossible").
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If that wasn't enough, said Mr. Nariman, there was also the odd case of
its placement within the Indian Penal Code. The Penal Code is divided into
23 chapters mostly based on broad categorizations of offenses: so while the
offense of sedition finds itself in the Chapter on Offences Against the State,
theft is in the Chapter on Offences Against Property of Theft. Chapter XIV
relates to Offences affecting the Public Health, Safety, Convenience, Decen-
cy and Morals -this would have been the logical place to position Section
377. And yet, it finds itself in Chapter XVI ,as part of a group of Offences
affecting the Human Body. Mr. Nariman argued that this implied the Sec-
tion could only be interpreted to constitute a bodily harm - for instance
when the carnal intercourse was non-consensual. In the case of consensual
sexual intercourse between adults of the same sex though, no discernible
harm could be gleaned. The placement of this Section, if construed to en-
compass consensual sex, was then absurd. This point didn't seem to garner
much muster with the Court; the Bench's response noted that the Section
did deal with offences affecting the body, since spreading of diseases,
which was possible here, would come under the umbrella term. Mr.
Nariman didn't go too much further on this point.
B. What Goes Where? Sexual Acts and Lost Identities
The issue before the judges was clear: the Delhi High Court had re-
frained from entering a discussion on exactly what acts constituted carnal
intercourse against the order of nature. It had taken as granted the impact
of the section on a particular community, and thus issued a declaration stat-
ing that Section 377 would be unconstitutional insofar as it criminalized
consensual sexual intercourse between adults in private. The Supreme
Court judges continued to express their dissatisfaction with this point in
subsequent questioning.
Following Mr. Nariman came Mr. Anand Grover, representing Naz
Foundation. He too was faced with a volley of questions cataloguing what
sexual acts were being discussed in the first place. Why, the Court asked,
was Mr. Grover saying that the law targeted all homosexuals when it
seemed to affect a very broad "whoever"? He responded that the basic act
targeted was anal sex, an act which he argued was much more central as a
sexual expression for gay men. By prohibiting anal sex, the only form of
"carnal intercourse" available to gay men, the law robbed them of their
constitutional rights. He further raised the Right to Health argument, stat-
ing that Section 377 impeded efforts related to HIV/ AIDS prevention since
it drove men-having-sex-with-men populations underground and made it
more dangerous for them to access information on safe sex practices. The
Court persisted in questioning Mr. Grover on the acts targeted under the
section, dissatisfied with the link with identity that he proposed.
I1212013]
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Next up was Mr. Shyam Diwan, representing Voices Against 377. Mr.
Diwan's strategy was to take the case away from the minutiae of sexual act
semantics and frame it as a broader rights issue. He argued that the case
was centrally about the moral citizenship of a section of the population-
the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community. He submitted that
the case wasn't merely about sexual acts, and that it was essentially about a
community which couldn't attain full expression of its sexuality because of
the law and social norms. The petition at hand couldn't by itself transform
social norms, but it could seek a declaration from the Court that at least
took the community outside the shadow of criminality.
In continuing with this attempt at humanizing the legal rhetoric, he di-
rected the Court's attention to a prior moment in the arguments, when they
asked government counsel if he knew anybody who was gay or lesbian.
Mr. Diwan said that he would like to answer that question-yes, he did
know LGBT people; he knew people from the community as part of his
family, his friends, and his colleagues. If this was an otherwise silent group,
it was because of the social stigma it faced as a result of its criminalization.
This personalization of the queer narrative evokes a story about the
Bowers v. Hardwick case that has become one of the biggest "what-ifs" of the
American LGBT movement. Bowers was a 5-4 decision in favor of holding
that the constitutional right to privacy did not protect homosexuals from
prosecution for sexual conduct within a private space. Justice Powell, who
cast the deciding vote, was on the fence right till the end. Years later, Pow-
ell admitted he felt he'd made a mistake: "When I had the opportunity to
reread the opinions a few months later I thought the dissent had the better
of the arguments."64 As documented by his biographer, Powell also once
stated that he believed he'd never met a homosexual. 65 The irony is that this
particular discussion took place with his law clerk, Cabell Chinnis, who
happened to be gay. Chinnis chose not to come out to Powell, while this
story crystallized into an odd little cautionary tale for, amongst other peo-
ple, closeted law clerks across the world. The question lingers on many
minds: would Justice Powell have reconsidered his opinion if he realized he
actually knew a gay man?
Mr. Diwan thus sought to put a face on the story, if in an indirect man-
ner. He went on to read out a series of affidavits that ranged in subject mat-
ter from the brutal rape and torture of a hijra66 to an account of a gay man's
struggles with coming out and acceptance. The affidavits recounted in-
stances where persons who belonged to a particular sexual orientation had
been subject to different kinds of violence. Mr. Diwan was advancing the
64. Linda Greenhouse, The Legacy of Lewis F. Powell Jr., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/04/poliics/04SCOT.html.
65. Id.
66. A group identity in which a transgender person who is biologically male takes on the
gender role of a female.
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argument that the LGBT community was being specifically and dispropor-
tionately targeted under the ambit of Section 377. And yet, the Court
seemed unconvinced about the idea that an LGBT "community" was being
targeted. Section 377 seemed to start and end with the list of sexual acts it
covered; the fact that certain groups of people engaged in those acts more
than others did not seem to be a relevant consideration for them.
Consequently, even when Mr. Diwan's arguments focused on how the
law violated the constitutional right to equality and non-discrimination, the
Bench's questions continued to focus on acts. They wanted a list of acts up-
on which we could base our arguments. Even when the question of homo-
sexuals as a minority group came up, the Court said that it was concerned
with sexual acts, which weren't as such in the majority or minority.
This made it particularly difficult to advance the fundamental equality
claim that had been so successful before the Delhi High Court. To satisfy
the requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution, which deals with the
right to equality, the petitioners had to show that a classification had been
made in the first place. On the opposing side, Mr. Sharan argued that there
was no class targeted by Section 377, that no classification had been made,
and that the High Court's finding that the law violated Article 14 was
without any basis. There was no empirical data, he said, to show that there
was a homosexual "community," and there was nothing to prove that they
constituted a class. The Bench seemed to follow a similar line of thought,
asking why we were talking of community when there was no commune,
and commenting that the community to which we were referring was an
indistinctive part of society.
One of the judges expressed his difficulty in acknowledging sexual
preference as a basis for class distinction through a specific example - an
incident in Punjab where an inspector got hold of three ladies who were
frequent pickpockets, and then he had tattoos engraved on their foreheads
to identify them as such. Wouldn't this also constitute a class, no matter
how small?
It was becoming clearer that the arguments would have to take the is-
sue to a further level of abstraction, that LGBT rights language had to give
way to a broader human rights rhetoric. Instead of arguing that carnal in-
tercourse against the order of nature constituted same-sex sexual inter-
course, the argument would have to be modified to posit that such carnal
intercourse included certain sexual acts that were common across sexual
identities.
Thus, Mr. Ashok Desai, who followed Mr. Diwan, spoke at length on
the right to privacy and how Section 377 affected the rights of everyone, be
they homosexual or heterosexual, to have certain kinds of sexual inter-
course. Mr. Desai argued that the section was cast in the widest possible
terms with the word "whoever," and included both homosexuals and het-
erosexuals. The words "carnal intercourse" included all physical relation-
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ships; the phrase "against the order of nature" would include contraception
as well as oral and anal sex within the marital relationship. He spoke at
length about the evolution of the right to privacy in Indian and internation-
al case law, locating it within the constitutionally enumerated right to per-
sonal liberty. He made sure to express that his arguments were wide
enough to encompass heterosexuals and homosexuals. In essence what he
was stating was that the law must stop at bedroom doors, irrespective of
which sexual acts consenting adults did behind them.
C. The Government and the Colonial Narrative
Where did the State figure in all of this?
Recall that the Delhi High Court proceedings had featured a divergent
stance from the Union of India: the Ministry of Home Affairs had opposed
Naz Foundation's petition, while the Health Ministry had been in favor of
decriminalization. Initially it seemed like the status quo would remain un-
changed. As he had before the High Court, Additional Solicitor General
P.P. Malhotra represented the Home Ministry. He argued that homosexual-
ity was immoral, and even that homosexual intercourse led to a higher
chance of disease; that the Delhi High Court's judgment was flawed in its
over-reliance on "foreign judgments;" and finally that the law's obstruction
to HIV/AIDS prevention efforts could not be a valid consideration, as
hardship was no ground to invalidate a law and the law could not please
everybody.
This was all fine, except that as Mr. Malhotra finished his submissions,
another Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Mohan Jain, stood before the
Court and stated that the arguments presented so far did not actually rep-
resent the government's current stance. He pointed out that the Union of
India had not filed an appeal. As much as this indiscretion on the govern-
ment's behalf angered the court, which promptly chastised the government,
it represented an intriguing development. What would this new stance be,
we wondered?
It first came to light with a government affidavit the following week,
stating that a group of ministers had decided in 2009 that the High Court
judgment did not suffer from "any error of law" and should not be ap-
pealed, a decision the Cabinet accepted later in the year. The Attorney
General of India, Mr. Goolam Vahanvati (A.G.) was then summoned by the
Court to clarify the government's position. Again, it turned out to be a
largely positive one, with the A.G. even going so far as to place the law in
its socio-historical background. Reading from Lawrence James' historical
account of British India, the A.G. pointed out the contrast between the
treatment of homosexuals in India and Britain in 1861. Where Britain had a
deeply repressive regime, even punishing buggery as a capital crime till
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1861, India was much more liberal. Many sought to escape Victorian sexual
repression and came to India, which in turn prompted "sexual imperial-
ism" as the British imposed their sexual mores on India. He concluded that
Indian society clearly had a much greater tolerance for homosexuality than
its British counterpart, and that the introduction of Section 377 in India was
not a reflection of existing Indian values and traditions. Rather, it was im-
posed upon Indian society due to the moral views of colonizers.
I believe the importance of this particular line of argument is clear once
we look back to the Bench's reaction to a similar submission from Ashok
Desai. In that instance, Mr. Desai had handed the book Same Sex Love in In-
dia: A Literary History67 to the Court. The book demonstrates that same-sex
desire has been prevalent throughout the history of Indian literature, trac-
ing descriptions of same-sex desire from the ancient epics to modern writ-
ers and artists. The book seemed to leave an impression on the Court, as a
judge observed aloud that a variety of writers depicted same-sex attraction
as a natural part of Indian society. Presently, though, it was viewed as a
perversion, a notion that had been thrust upon India by the British. This co-
lonial narrative then was a strategically useful frame to place the issue of
homosexuality in.
This argument didn't work nearly as well with my parents. A lament of
"what will people say? This isn't tolerated by our society!" is not best an-
swered in a domestic setting with the reassurance, "Ancient Indian society
was fine with it: look at those old temple carvings." My parents simply re-
sponded, "Well, they also walked around naked back then. That wouldn't
be encouraged today would it?"
At least my parents were not Supreme Court judges.
D. Mental Health
One of the final interventions to be heard in the Supreme Court from
our side was filed on behalf of mental health professionals. The interven-
tion combined thirteen affidavits of psychiatrists and doctors from across
the country testifying that homosexuality was not a mental disorder, that it
was natural and normal, and that efforts at conversion therapy would
prove damaging and futile. Perhaps it was the fact that this petition came
up for hearing after five weeks of arguments over the matter, or perhaps it
was because Mr. Shyam Diwan had already covered some of its points in
his own submissions - either way, Mr. Dayan Krishnan, representing the
mental health professionals, was barely given five minutes to argue by the
Court.
As he stood up to submit the medical consensus on homosexuality not
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being a disease, the Bench responded that they didn't want to know wheth-
er or not it was a disease, and asked whether there were sexologists among
the doctors. When he attempted to continue with his submission by de-
scribing the American Psychiatric Association's position on homosexuality,
the Bench said that Section 377 was not about homosexuals - that to argue
so was to misunderstand the issue. Once again, we were back to that ques-
tion.
If there was ever a moment during the proceedings where I'd felt the
urge to stand up and implore the Court to acknowledge a point, it was this.
A few days before the mental health intervention came up for hearing, the
Court had closed for a weeklong holiday, during which I'd decided to fly
home and face it out with my parents. An hour after landing in my
hometown, my parents took me to the friendly neighborhood psychiatrist.
Partly because I've forgotten his name, and partly because I'd prefer to
block it out anyway, I'll go with the moniker Dr. Doctor. As I was ushered
into the doctor's room, I took a second to take in the array of medals and
certificates plastered across the walls. My parents positioned themselves on
either side of me. Dr. Doctor surveyed me wordlessly for a few seconds,
tilted his head sideways, and leaned forward -
"Do you know why you're here?"
Of course I did, but I wasn't going to give him that. I stared at him
blankly.
"You're here ... because you're homosexual."
Spotted.
"How do you feel about being homosexual?"
I broke my silence - "Oh, I'm actually quite happy about being gay."
He flinched visibly. "So you're saying you're fine with being gay."
As the fact sunk into his head, he looked right at my mother, then back
at me, and asked, "So basically if your mother commits suicide because of
you, that's all right with you?"
Now it was my turn to flinch. I turned to look at my mother, then back
at him. "Well, by that logic, how is the reverse acceptable? What if I commit
suicide because she's unable to accept me for who I am?"
I sensed a mildly convulsive movement from beside me, but I couldn't
take my gaze off the doctor. He got down to brass tacks. "So there are three
ways in which we can approach this condition. One, homosexuality might
be caused by hormonal imbalances. Two, it could be a result of some tumor
in the brain. And third, it could be caused by some other mental disorder."
And just like that, I'd had enough. This wasn't the time for gentle rea-
soning; it was time for theatrics. I took out my phone, placed it on the table,
and told him - "Just so you know, I've recorded this entire conversation.
And you look confused, so let me tell you why I've done that. I'm going to
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use this as evidence for the FIR68 I file against you as soon as I walk out of
this office."
For the first time since we walked into his room, his smug smile wa-
vered. "What would you do that for?"
"Well, for starters, I'm going to have you booked for medical malprac-
tice and causing emotional distress. You have all these big certificates and
medals around your office, and yet you don't seem to know that the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association declassified homosexuality from its list of men-
tal disorders back in 1973. And, oh, that the World Health Organization had
it removed from its International Classification of Diseases in 1990. Yet here
you are, trying to pass this off as a disease that I should be trying to cure."
In panic now, he looked at my parents, but they were unable to look
him in the eye. One final attempt - "He - he could be suffering from para-
noid schizophrenia, that's why he's talking like this!" Unable to take it an-
ymore, I got up and stormed out of the room. He didn't call back for me.
In 2001, the National Human Rights Commission admitted a complaint
from a patient at the All Indian Institute of Medical Sciences, alleging psy-
chiatric abuse at the hands of the consulting doctor. The patient had been
put on a four-year course of drugs and told he had to be "cured" of his ho-
mosexuality. The NHRC finally chose to reject the complaint; informal con-
versations with its chairman showed his belief that until Section 377 was
read down, nothing could be done. 69
Medicine in India continues to be obsessed with curing homosexuality,
with health professionals in many places still offering behavioral therapy
that includes electric shock treatment as well as therapy that includes psy-
chiatric drugs and hormones to "cure" patients of homosexual desire. 70 In-
terviews with psychiatrists in Bangalore have highlighted their belief in the
possibility of discovering which gene determines sexual preference and sci-
entifically suppressing it.71
Of course, quacks exist across the spectrum, and medical malpractice is
barely limited to giving disastrous advice and/or treatment to persons "af-
flicted" with homosexuality. To understand how the debate moves beyond
merely unqualified doctors, we have to factor in the medical category of
ego-dystonic homosexuality, which the World Health Organization (WHO)
has endorsed. 72 Here, the gender identity or sexual preference of the indi-
68. First Information Report - a complaint filed with the police by the victim of a cogniza-
ble offense.
69. Arvind Narrain and Tarunabh Khaitan, Medicalisation of Homosexuality: A Human Rights
Approach, in HUMJINSI: A RESOURCE BOOK ON LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL RIGHTS IN INDIA 29,
34 (Bina Fernandez, ed., rev. ed. 2002).
70. Vinay Chandran, Executive Director, Suabhava Trust, Ain't No Cure for Love, India
Together, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www.indiatogether.org/2006/apr/hrt-nocure.htm.
71. Id.
72. See World Health Organization, The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Dis-
orders: Diagnostic Criteria for Research F66.1 (1993), available at http://www.who.int/
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vidual is not in doubt, but the individual wishes it were different and seeks
treatment.73 The way a number of psychiatrists engage with this category is
summed up by the statement "it's not my job to tell him that it's okay to be
gay." Instead, it seems that the psychiatrist's job is to attempt to "cure" the
oft-acknowledged incurable.
The fundamental factor not taken into account by this diagnosis is that
it is very often the environment that surrounds the expression of homosex-
ual identity that the patient is concerned about, as opposed to merely the
idea of being LGBT. The relationship between patient and doctor is a fidu-
ciary one, premised on absolute trust. In consulting a doctor, the patient en-
trusts fundamental decisionmaking powers to the practitioner. The medical
professional is often unable to comprehend the question of choice. This, in
turn, results in effectively infringing the patient's autonomy: the compo-
nent of attaining fulfillment, the growth in self-esteem that the Delhi High
Court elaborated on is robbed in the process of stifling sexuality, even
when it is something the patient specifically requests the doctor for.
IV. AND Now, WE WAIT
A national civil society meeting was held in Bangalore a few months
following the hearings. Called to discuss the trajectory of the LGBT move-
ment as it would proceed after the Supreme Court's judgment, the meeting
reflected the two major pathways the decision would lead us down. The
first half of the meeting focused on the possibility of the Supreme Court
overturning the High Court's verdict and re-criminalizing homosexuality in
India; the second half focused on a positive verdict. Of course, it was
acknowledged, it wouldn't necessarily be as clear cut as that. Beyond these
scenarios, there was also the possibility of the Supreme Court upholding
the lower court's judgment in essence, but striking down some of its im-
portant jurisprudential innovations. Alternately, the Court might refer the
matter to a larger bench of judges within the Supreme Court, or even to the
Parliament, in which case our initial post-decision effort would be to pre-
vent a stay on the Delhi High Court's judgment.
The Supreme Court's decision can either further crystallize or instead
discard some of the remarkable principles of jurisprudence that the Delhi
High Court developed. As mentioned earlier, there is the Court's remarka-
ble discussion of constitutional morality. Using constitutional morality to
test the bounds of a compelling state interest would imply a moral code
that is based on the liberal democratic ideals that underlie the Indian Con-
stitution, not any particular religious or cultural traditions.7 4 This kind of
classifications/icd/en/GRNBOOK.pdf.
73. Id.
74. Naz Foundation v. NCT of Delhi and Others, 160 (2009) DLT 277 para 79.
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test would serve as an important check on attempts to restrict various kinds
of expression - be it political, artistic or even romantic - in Indian society,
with public morality used as the barometer. As Arvind Narrain notes, con-
stitutional morality "requires the court to play the role of a counter majori-
tarian institution which takes upon itself the responsibility of protecting
constitutionally entrenched rights, regardless of what the majority may be-
lieve."75
Also significant is the manner in which the Supreme Court construes
the Article 15 argument. Naz Foundation's expansion of the grounds for dis-
crimination under this article represented an important strategic move,
opening a door to constitutional protections for groups marginalized on un-
listed grounds, such as disability or HIV positive status.76 Upholding this
interpretation would allow the judgment to stand as an important advocacy
tool for other such marginalized groups in their future struggles as well."
If the judgment does land in our favor, and if homosexuality is once
and for all decriminalized, we'll only then have seen the Indian LGBT
community's first concrete step towards emancipation. Decriminalization is
only the first goal in a journey towards full moral citizenship: a journey that
transitions from the right to be let alone to the right to be recognized by the
State. This new paradigm raises a range of issues relating to positive politi-
cal claims.
The first issue revolves around the legal recognition of same-sex rela-
tionships in India. A system of legal pluralism dominates Indian family
law, with religious groups governed by separate codes, all of which clearly
restrict marriage to mixed-sex couples within religious boundaries. The first
redefinition of marriage and sexual union in India happened with the pas-
sage of the Special Marriage Act of 1954, which permitted secular marriage
across caste and communities, though still framed within the bounds of
heterosexual unions. The exclusion of same-sex couples from this institu-
tion denies them a range of basic entitlements available to heterosexual
couples. The first question to explore would hinge on the feasibility of ad-
vocating for same-sex marriage rights, or instead arguing for civil unions. If
we pursue both options simultaneously - and I believe this might be the
best path - the secondary set of issues would revolve around how we con-
ceive of and advocate for these new legal frameworks. Arguments for
same-sex marriage would almost certainly have to focus on amending the
secular marriage law as opposed to religious laws. On the question of civil
75. Arvind Narrain, A New Language of Morality, in LAW LIKE LOVE: QUEER PERSPECTIVES ON
THE LAW 253, 274 (Arvind Narrain & Alok Gupta eds., 2011).
76. See Tarunabh Khaitan, Reading Swaraj into Article 15 - A New Deal for Minorities, in LAW
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unions, it would be worth considering whether we should imagine the in-
stitution as one available to heterosexual couples as well.
The second major issue is that of anti-discrimination provisions for
LGBT people at the institutional level. Indian anti-discrimination laws have
been largely focused on reservation, with other aspects such as equal op-
portunity and diversity promotion for all vulnerable groups having only
gained importance recently. The new interpretation of Article 15, if it
stands, will play an important role in making positive legal claims with re-
spect to creating safe institutional spaces for LGBT people.
The arguments for relationship recognition and non-discrimination
represent a new challenge to the rights movement, in that they shift from a
paradigm of tolerance to that of staking a positive political claim. The third
issue I'd like to highlight moves between the two claims: the status of the
transgender community in India. Unlike the gay, lesbian, and bisexual
community, the transgender community's status of criminalization hasn't
been completely erased since the Delhi High Court's judgment.
Even as the LGBT community as a whole awaits the Supreme Court's
final verdict on decriminalization, the Indian transgender community -
represented to a large extent by the hijras - remain cast under a shadow of
criminality through other avenues. The 2011 Police Act enacted by the State
of Karnataka resurrects the spirit of the draconian Criminal Tribes Act of
1871, which reversed the principle of presumption of innocence, mandating
local governments to keep registers of the names and residences of hijras as
automatic suspects for crimes. The hijra community is also targeted through
the rampant misuse of the Immoral Trafficking Prevention Act. While the
Act's objective is to criminalize institutional structures that result in human
trafficking, it ends up primarily targeting the visible figure of the sex work-
er and enables the police to arrest and intimidate the transgender sex-
worker population.
If the hijra community is hyper-visible in the domain of criminal law, it
encounters complete invisibility when it comes to civil law. Identity docu-
ments ranging from driver's licenses to ration cards don't allow for a
transgender option, thus depriving the community of a range of state enti-
tlements. Beyond identity documents, Sexual Reassignment Surgery (SRS),
an essential aspect of realizing transgender identity, remains prohibitively
expensive. Those seeking the surgery often rely on unqualified medical
practitioners, which in turn exposes them to post-operative complications.
And when it comes to the legal recognition of transgender relationships, the
law again falls short. India's secular marriage legislation and its individual
religious legal codes clearly restrict marriage to male-female couples, thus
disallowing the transgender community access to this institution.
Even as the Naz litigation approaches its possible end, another major
suit is set to begin. The National Legal Services Authority of India recently
filed a petition before the Supreme Court of India asking for the recognition
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of a range of rights for the transgender community in India. Amongst the
various measures that the petition asks for are directives to the government
ensuring access to basic necessities like shelter, food, clothes, medical facili-
ties, education, and identity documents, as well as a realization of the
transgender community's right to marriage and adoption.
These aren't the only conversations afoot, of course. Voices of change
within the courtrooms speak in tandem with whispers of change outside.
Where popular culture once refused to engage with LGBT issues, an in-
creasing number of Indian films feature queer themes and characters. We
may not have a Brokeback Mountain yet, but we did have a wonderfully em-
pathetic portrayal of a supporting gay character in the recent acclaimed re-
lease English Vinglish.78 Even notoriously heterosexist Indian television got
a major shot in its queer arm with the soap Maryada -Lekin Kab Tak?.79 The
show begins as the story of four women in a family in the North Indian
state of Haryana, leading to a storyline where a married son turns out to be
in love with another man.80 Our Pride marches continue to grow and ex-
pand to smaller cities with every passing year. Queer literature continues to
find larger takers - and writers - in the country, with this year featuring the
release of the first queer anthology of stories since the Delhi High Court's
judgment. I'll end using my own words from my contribution in that an-
thology:
In the heart of Bangalore, in the middle of Cubbon park, is the bandstand.
Huddled under this deceptively unwieldy structure, 50 odd queer folk narrate sto-
ries of love, loss and everything in between as we celebrate another year without
377. There are many ways of being proud, many ways of celebrating pride. Those
colourful marches are the ones we've let the world become the most familiar with,
but what I see happening today feels equally important. I feel every different, dis-
parate narration today knitting us into this one tapestry of consciousness.
Where do we go from here?
I think we need to tell more stories. I think that's important. I think we need to
have more conversations. If the Supreme Court Appeal is overturned, and if we
find ourselves once more in the margins of the law - well, we'll need to fight. But if
the Appeal is upheld, if we continue to remain legal citizens - well, we need to fight
just as hard. We need to make sure this darn homosexuality business is talked
about to death in the university, in the workplace, on television - to make people as
tired of seeing a constant queer presence as they possibly can be. We need to be un-
abashedly loud and unapologetically obnoxious and while we're at it - remember to
dress fashionably.
But really, most importantly, more than anything else - we need to keep tell-
78.ENGLISH VINGLISH (Eros International 2012).
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ing those stories.81
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